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ABSTRACT
Under what circumstances can a social network user be
compelled to turn over his or her user identification and
password in civil litigation? In three recent cases, courts
attempted to answer this question with varied results. The
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division refused to
allow discovery of private Facebook information in
McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. because the
discovery request was not sufficiently tailored to reach
discoverable information. Soon thereafter, the same court
allowed discovery of similar material in Romano v.
Steelcase, Inc. based on the level of publicity of the social
networking account. In McMillen v. Hummingbird
Speedway, Inc., the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
allowed discovery of private Facebook information based
upon similar considerations as the Romano court. The
McMillen court questioned whether the plaintiff should be
allowed to block discovery by asserting an evidentiary
privilege and determined that no reasonable expectation of
confidentiality exists on social networking sites. The court
determined that as long as a person’s social network sites
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contain information relevant to the lawsuit, courts should
allow litigants to utilize “all rational means for
ascertaining the truth.” This Article first summarizes the
potential bases to prohibit discovery of social networking
information and communication. It then examines the
recent case law and identifies the level of protection courts
are willing to afford social networking communication and
the login information needed to access them in civil
discovery.
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INTRODUCTION
As the popularity of social networking sites continues to surge,
civil litigants increasingly demand disclosure of online
communications. Opponents of broad social networking discovery
have asserted several arguments as to why social media
information should be protected from discovery. First, such
requests are not relevant under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) 34 and 45 and therefore not discoverable. Second, social
networking information should be protected by an evidentiary
privilege—akin to attorney-client privilege or marital privileges—
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and inaccessible by opposing counsel. Finally, litigants sometimes
argue that the Fourth Amendment affords some protection from
unreasonable intrusions into their privacy.
In analyzing whether to order disclosure of online
communications, courts have not only considered the above
arguments, but have also looked at the social networking sites’
terms of service and privacy policies. Those policies are relevant in
determining whether users have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their online communications. Ultimately, few courts
find a reasonable expectation of privacy because many sites warn
that most information is not private.
This Article first summarizes the varying bodies of law that
courts have employed in determining when social networking
information is discoverable. Next, this Article looks at three recent
decisions that apply one or more of the above rationales and shed
light on the discoverability of social networking data and the
credentials—i.e., the usernames and passwords—needed to access
that data: McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., Romano v.
Steelcase, Inc., and McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co., all
decided in 2010.
I. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND SOCIAL NETWORKING
DISCOVERY
A. Discoverability and Relevancy
Civil litigants attempt to protect social media communications
from discovery in many ways, including arguments that the
information is not relevant. However, under both FRCP 34—
discovery directed at parties to the litigation—and FRCP
45(A)(1)(c)—discovery directed at non-parties—the bar for
relevancy in the context of discovery is extremely low. 1 Although
courts frame the judicial tests used to interpret these rules in
different ways, all of these tests have a presumption in favor of
discoverability. 2
1
2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 and infra note 3.
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The most widely used test only requires that courts consider
“whether or not evidence might be admissible, or reasonably
calculated to lead to any evidence that might be found material, or
relevant in determination of issues involved in proceeding.” 3 The
information sought need not be proven relevant, but only needs to
“appear relevant.” 4 Once this low threshold is met, the party
resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of
relevance. The resisting party must show that the information
sought is of “such marginal relevance that the potential harm
occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary
presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” 5
B. Discoverability and Evidentiary Privileges
While most courts will find that online social communications
are relevant, those communications may still be excluded from
discovery if they are protected by an evidentiary privilege.
Evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege or
marital privilege, are a creation of the common law and are not
explicitly provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, common law privileges are to be
strictly construed. 7 Courts may recognize a new category of
privileges, but to do so the claimant of the privilege bears the

3

Hess v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 49 F.R.D. 271, 272
(1970) (emphasis added); see also National Utility Service, Inc. v. Northwestern
Steel & Wire Co., 426 F.2d 222, 225 (1970) (discovery “motion may be verified
in any reasonable manner demonstrating that the material sought is relevant to
the issues and that there is some good reason for enlisting the power of the court
in uncovering the information.”) (emphasis added) (citing Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118–19 (1964)); U.S. v. 50.34 Acres of Land, More or
Less, in Village of East Hills, Nassau County, N.Y., 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (1952)
(documents are discoverable “where they might give clues as to the existence or
location of relevant facts, or where they might be useful for purposes of
impeachment or corroboration.”) (emphasis added).
4
E.E.O.C. v. Thorman & Wright Corp., 243 F.R.D. 426, 429 (2007).
5
Id. (emphasis added). A “potential harm” may well be the loss of privacy
experienced by the litigant forced to turn over private information.
6
Fed. R. Evid. 501, Advisory Committee Notes.
7
Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
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burden of proof and must meet a four-step test. 8 To establish a
“social media communication privilege” litigants would be
required to meet the following test:
First, the claimant must establish that he or she
divulged the communication with confidence that
they would not be disclosed;
Second, the claimant must show that the element of
confidentiality is essential to fully and satisfactorily
maintain the relationship between the parties;
Third, the claimant must establish that there is
community agreement that the relationship must be
sedulously fostered; and
Fourth, the claimant must show that the injury
potentially sustained to the relationship because of
the disclosure outweighs the benefit of correctly
disposing of the litigation. 9
If the claimant fails to establish the existence of any one of these
four factors, the court will not recognize a privilege of
confidentiality and, unless another exception applies, will require
disclosure of the information sought by the opposing party.
In the case of a new “social media communication privilege,”
the litigant seeking the communication’s exclusion would have to
show that the conversations were presumed confidential, a difficult
task when the entire premise of social media is to share
information with a large number of people.
Even if the party resisting discovery can establish a
presumption of privacy, that party would further have to show the
importance of the relationship between the communicating parties
and that social media relationships are deserving of protection.
Courts would likely not find that social media communication
should be “sedulously fostered” to the same degree as
8

See McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc. 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa.
Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (citing Matter of Adoption of Embick, 506 A.2d 455,
461 (Pa. Super. 1986); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton’s
rev. ed. 1961).
9
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton’s rev. ed. 1961).
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communications within marriage or communications with one’s
attorney. Moreover, the medium of exchange is unlike private oneon-one consultation between spouses or attorneys and their clients.
The privilege was not established to protect public
communications. And disclosure of confidential information—
even on blogs or in online chats—results in a waiver of the
privilege itself. 10
In sum, litigants often cannot hide behind the low relevancy
bar to discoverability and courts will rarely, if ever, create a new
evidentiary privilege. Most civil litigants will face an uphill battle
if they try to exclude social networking information under the
FRCP or the Federal Rules of Evidence. As such, some litigants
seeking to block such discovery have turned to the right to privacy
contained in the Fourth Amendment. 11
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “RIGHT TO PRIVACY” AND
DISCOVERABILITY
The right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment was first
proposed by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in an 1890
Harvard Law Review article. 12 The right was characterized as
essentially the “right to be left alone.” It was not until the Supreme
Court decided Katz v. United States in 1967 that the right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment gained traction. 13 In what
would come to be the predominant constitutional test, Justice
Harlan in his concurrence proposed a two-part analysis to
determine whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to
privacy has been violated: first, whether the individual had an
actual expectation of privacy; and second, whether the individual’s
expectation was “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 14 If either prong fails, the individual has no
10

See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2010 WL 4789099 at *1150 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2010).
11
See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
12
See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
13
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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reasonable expectation of privacy, and the government intrusion
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 15 The Fourth Amendment
only protects against government intrusions that violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Katz court further held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information you have "knowingly
exposed" to a third-party. 16 As such, Supreme Court cases
following Katz have held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in phone records, bank records, or trash set out for
collection. 17
Does the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy extend to
civil discovery requests? Likely it does not. The Fourth
Amendment only curtails government action and does not apply to
private searches. 18 And one federal district court proclaimed in
dicta that “[i]t strains common sense and constitutional analysis to
conclude that the fourth amendment was meant to protect against
unreasonable discovery demands made by a private litigant in the
course of civil litigation.” 19 But litigants should not ignore the Katz
15

Id.
See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (“what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”) (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210
(1966) and United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
17
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (“respondents
exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment protection,” as they “deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly
suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption,
for the express purpose of having strangers take it.’”) (quoting United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 752–53 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded
conversations by police informant when defendant volunteered information to
this third-party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”) (citing United States
v. White, 401 U.S. at 1126; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966);
and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
18
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
19
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 102
(S.D.N.Y.1979).
16

144

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:2

test altogether in the civil context. Some courts still entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges to discovery requests, and courts
often look to the reasonableness of a party’s expectation of privacy
in social networking communication. 20
III. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES’ TERMS OF SERVICE
AND PRIVACY POLICIES
Several courts have looked to social networking sites’ terms of
service as a factor in determining the degree of privacy expected
by the user. These terms of service and their relevant disclaimers
illustrate the lack of privacy protections in place for social network
users who wish to keep their data undiscoverable.
For example, Facebook’s Data Use Policy reads in pertinent
part:
Your information is the information that’s required
when you sign up for the site, as well as the
information you choose to share.
Registration information: When you sign up for
Facebook, you are required to provide your name,
email address, birthday, and gender.
Information you choose to share: Your information
also includes the information you choose to share
on Facebook, such as when you post a status
update, upload a photo, or comment on a friend’s
story.
It also includes the information you choose to share
when you take an action, such as when you add a
friend, like a Page or a website, add a place to your
story, find friends using our contact importers, or
indicate you are in a relationship.
Your name, profile pictures, cover photos, gender,
networks, username and User ID are treated just
like information you choose to make public. . . .
20

See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
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We receive information about you from your
friends and others, such as when they upload your
contact information, post a photo of you, tag you in
a photo or status update, or at a location, or add you
to a group.
When people use Facebook, they may store and
share information about you and others that they
have, such as when they upload and manage their
invites and contacts. . . .
[F]or information others share about you, they
control how it is shared. . . .
We store data for as long as it is necessary to
provide products and services to you and others. . . .
Typically, information associated with your account
will be kept until your account is deleted. For
certain categories of data, we may also tell you
about specific data retention practices. 21
Moreover, Facebook’s Data Use Policy states that in order to
respond to legal requests and prevent harm, Facebook’s operators
may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or
other civil or criminal requests if they have a good faith belief that
the law requires them to respond. 22
MySpace has very similar policies that read in pertinent part:
There may be instances when Myspace may access
or disclose PII [Personal Identifiable Information],
Profile Information or non-PII without providing
you a choice in order to: (i) protect or defend the
legal rights or property of Myspace, our Affiliated
Companies or their employees, agents and
contractors (including enforcement of our
agreements); (ii) protect the safety and security of
Users of the Myspace Services or members of the
21

Data
Use
Policy,
FACEBOOK,
full_data_use_policy (last revised June 8, 2012).
22
Id.

http://www.facebook.com/
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public including acting in urgent circumstances; (iii)
protect against fraud or for risk management
purposes; or (iv) comply with the law or legal
process. 23
Litigants attempting to invoke their right to privacy based on a
reasonable expectation that information stored on either Facebook
or MySpace is private may face difficulty overcoming the fact that
according to the plain language of most social networking sites’
policies, little to no privacy is guaranteed.
IV. MCMILLEN V. HUMMINGBIRD SPEEDWAY, INC.
In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., a personal injury
action, plaintiff McMillen filed suit in an attempt to recover
damages for injuries he sustained when he was rear-ended after a
stock car race. 24 McMillen alleged substantial injuries, including
possible permanent impairment, loss of general health, and loss of
enjoyment of life. 25
The defendants sent a discovery request asking if McMillen
was a member of Facebook or any other social networking sites,
and if so, requested disclosure of his login information. McMillen
responded that he was a Facebook member, but that his user name
and password were confidential and privileged. 26
After reviewing the public portion of McMillen’s Facebook
account and discovering comments about his fishing trip and
attendance at another car race in Florida, the defendants filed a
motion to compel discovery, based on the assertion that such
information was relevant to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
damages claims. 27 Specifically, the defendants wanted to be able
“to determine whether or not plaintiff has made any other

23

Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last
updated October 1, 2012).
24
2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010).
25
Id. at *1.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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comments which impeach and contradict his disability and
damages claims.” 28
The court granted the defendants’ motion to compel based on
two judicial considerations. First, it noted that courts “should allow
litigants to utilize ‘all rational means for ascertaining the truth’”
where there exists some indication that social networking sites
contain relevant information. 29 And second, it stated that courts
generally disfavor granting evidentiary privileges. 30
The court recognized that our system of discovery allows for
broader pre-trial discovery of evidence than may ultimately be
admissible in trial. Anything relevant to the matter will be
discoverable at the outset of litigation, regardless of whether it will
be excluded in trial for other reasons. 31 Also, the court noted that
the law disfavors privileges because of the fundamental belief that
broad discovery best serves justice. 32 Because privileges are a
“derogation of the search for the truth,” they should be strictly
construed. 33 Based upon these two fundamental premises, the court
determined that access to social networking sites should be freely
granted.
While the court did not explicitly undertake a Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis, the court further commented on the
reasonable privacy expectations of a social networking site user
and determined that it is unrealistic for a user to expect that social
media communications will be kept confidential. In fact, such
users are assured only a “modicum of privacy.” 34 The privacy
terms on the social networking sites in question should dispel any
belief of confidentiality on behalf of the plaintiff. 35 The court
commented that “the complete access afforded to the Facebook
and MySpace operators alone defeats [Plaintiff’s] proposition that
28

Id. at *2.
Id. at *7 (quoting Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021, 1027
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)).
30
Id.
31
Id. at *2.
32
Id.
33
Id. (quoting Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908–09 (Pa. Super.
1992)).
34
Id. at *3.
35
Id. at *3-4.
29
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his communications are confidential.” 36 The right of
confidentiality is lost when an individual knows that a third party
could overhear or intercept the information. 37
In an assertive conclusion, the court emphasized that allowing
discovery of social networking sites in anticipation of litigation is
of very little detriment to society, while the benefits of proving the
truth or falsity of such claims “cannot be overstated.” 38
V. ROMANO V. STEELCASE, INC.
Only a few weeks after McMillen was decided, in Romano v.
Steelcase, Inc., a New York trial court again allowed defendants to
access private information on the plaintiff’s Facebook and
MySpace accounts. 39
In her personal injury action, plaintiff Romano claimed she had
sustained permanent injuries and was confined to her house
because of defendant’s negligence. 40 In an effort to contest the
extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, particularly her claims for loss of
enjoyment of life, the defendant sought discovery of the plaintiff’s
Facebook and MySpace accounts. The defendant based his request
on the fact that her public Facebook profile page showed her
smiling happily outside of her home. 41
In response to the defendant’s requests, Romano argued that
she held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her
home computer and her online postings under the Fourth
Amendment. 42 The court rejected Romano’s Fourth Amendment
claims and found that she in fact had no reasonable expectation of
privacy. The court looked to the reasonableness standard set forth
by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States, and asked whether
plaintiff had both exhibited an actual subjective expectation of
36

Id. at *5.
Id.
38
Id. at *6.
39
Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426, 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
40
Id. at 430.
41
Id. at 427. Under the local court rule, Civil Practice Law and Rule
(CPLR) 3101, “there shall be full disclosure of all non-privileged matter which
is material and necessary to the defense or prosecution of an action.”
42
Id. at 434.
37
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privacy and whether the expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable. 43 The court concluded that an additional factor
weighing against recognition of a right to privacy on social
networking sites is the fact that “privacy concerns are far less
where the beneficiary herself chose to disclose the information.” 44
Lastly, after reviewing the privacy disclaimers on both Facebook
and MySpace, the court determined that “when plaintiff created her
accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information
would be shared with others, notwithstanding her individual
privacy settings.” 45
Because the public portions of the pages contradicted her
claims and deposition testimony, the court concluded that there
was a “reasonable likelihood” the private portions of the sites
could contain evidence that was “material and relevant to the
defense” of the action and were therefore discoverable. 46 The court
based much of its decision upon the notion that “plaintiffs who
place their physical condition in controversy may not shield from
disclosure material which is necessary to the defense of the
action.” 47
The court further found that “[t]o deny defendant an
opportunity to access these sites would not only go against the
liberal pretrial disclosure and discovery policies of New York, but
would condone plaintiff's attempt to hide relevant information
behind self-regulated privacy settings,” a result the court found
unjust. 48
VI. ACCESS GRANTED
Litigants should pay particular attention to the practical effects
of these decisions. Not only did the McMillen and Romano courts
find that litigants could discover social media communication, but
43

Id. at 433 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967)).
Id. at 433. (citing Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No.
06-5337 (D. N.J., Dec. 14, 2007)).
45
Id. at 434.
46
Id. at 430.
47
Id. at 428 (citing Hoenig v. Westphal, 52 N.Y.2d 605 (1981)).
48
Id. at 432.
44
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they both ordered the litigants to turn over the credentials to their
accounts, thus allowing the requesting party unrestricted access to
the accounts. 49
Granting such sweeping access represents a break from
traditional electronic discovery orders. Normally, courts will not
invoke FRCP 34 to grant unrestricted access to a party’s electronic
database. 50 Rather, the requesting party may inspect and copy the
information after the producing party turns over the data in a
“reasonably usable form.” 51 The general rule is that courts will
only allow direct access to a party’s database after the court makes
a factual finding that the producing party failed to comply with
discovery rules and after considering the producing party’s
interests including the “preservation of his records, confidentiality
of non-discoverable matters and costs.” 52
By allowing access to the credentials of the accounts, the
courts in McMillen and Romano skipped the production step and
allowed the requesting party direct access. These cases indicate
that courts have concluded social media communication deserves
little privacy protection. In essence, the producing parties had such
a low interest in protecting the information that the courts did not
need to find that the party failed to comply with a discovery rule.
Not all courts grant such broad access. 53 But litigants should take
notice that a court may grant complete access to a party’s social
networking account.

49

McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com.
Pl. 2010); Romano, 30 Misc.3d at 435 (ordering that the plaintiff grant full
access to the account including the delivery “to counsel for defendant Steelcase
a properly executed consent and authorization as may be required by the
operators of Facebook and MySpace, permitting said defendant to gain access to
plaintiff's Facebook and MySpace records, including any records previously
deleted or archived by said operators.”).
50
U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 674 (M.D.
Fla. 2008) (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003)).
51
Id. (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d at 1316–17).
52
Id.
53
Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389, (E.D. Mich.
2012) (holding that a plaintiff to a civil suit need not turn over login information
to Facebook account at the defendant’s request, because that request was overly
broad).
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VII. COUNTERPOINT—MCCANN V. HARLEYSVILLE
INSURANCE CO.
Not all courts allow access to social media communication.
Less than two months after Romano—in a factually similar case—
another New York court came to an opposite conclusion and
affirmed the lower court’s denial of a motion to compel disclosure
of a Facebook account.
In McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. plaintiff McCann was
injured in an automobile accident and filed a suit seeking the
supplementary underinsured motorist coverage from her own
insurance carrier after claiming the entire insurance policy of the
other driver involved in the collision.54 During discovery, the
defendant, McCann’s insurance company, sought access to the
plaintiff’s Facebook account and photographs posted on the site.55
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s account was relevant to
the question of whether she had in fact sustained a serious injury. 56
Aside from this assertion, the defendant could not point to
anything in particular that her Facebook account would reveal.
The Supreme Court Appellate Division determined that the
defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of photographs and
seeking access to Plaintiff’s account information was properly
denied by the lower court as overly broad, but could be revisited
upon the service of a “new, proper discovery demand” at a future
date. 57 The denial was based on the fact that the defendant’s
request was insufficient because it “failed to establish a factual
predicate with respect to the relevancy of the evidence.” 58 This
was, in the words of the court, simply a “fishing expedition.”59

54

McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 78 A.D.3d 1524, 1524 (2010).
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1525 (citing Crazytown Furniture v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150
A.D.2d 420, 421 (1989)).
59
Id. at 1525.
55
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CONCLUSION
Opponents of social networking discovery requests will likely
face an uphill battle in their attempt to challenge such requests.
While the McCann court did deny the discovery requests aimed at
social networking information, it did so based on the overbroad
nature of the discovery request, not because social networking
communications deserve privacy protection. Therefore, while the
legal grounds for preventing or allowing social networking
discovery are unclear, courts that have considered social
networking discovery requests have sent a clear message: social
networking communications are discoverable. Advocates of broad
social media discovery have two important factors on their side:
first, the judicial consensus that courts should permit litigants to
utilize “all rational means for ascertaining the truth;” and second,
courts’ established resistance to creating new evidentiary
privileges.
Moreover, McMillen and Romano show that litigants can gain
direct access to a party’s social networking accounts by obtaining
login and password information via discovery requests. Some
courts have determined that these accounts are so undeserving of
protection that they will skip the normal production step and allow
direct access to the accounts themselves. Attorneys and litigants
should take notice of this important development. However,
remember that fishing expeditions—like the one in McCann—are
never permitted. Social networking data is an easy target, but
courts still refuse to declare “open season” on irrelevant data. In
sum, while discovery of social networking information is a
developing body of jurisprudence, the takeaway for the time being
is that social networkers should proceed with caution when
disclosing information on the web.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Some courts have granted unrestricted access to social
networking accounts by requiring disclosure of usernames,
passwords, and deleted posts stored by the sites.



McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. may merely address
overbroad discovery requests and should not be interpreted
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as a decision on the contours of protecting private personal
information. The importance of McCann is that litigants
seeking access to social networking information should
clearly specify the “factual predicate” upon which they
seek access to social networking information.


Because data use and privacy policies on social networking
sites are constantly evolving to comply with changing
regulatory law and public opinion, litigants should be
careful when relying on the precedential value of previous
decisions. There very well may have been a wholesale
upheaval of the social networking sites’ policies since a
prior decision. For example, since the above cases were
decided, both Facebook and MySpace have made changes
to their privacy policies.



Blocking social networking communication may not be as
futile as the above cases make it seem. The best approach
may be to make a more nuanced argument than those that
were made in the above cases. While factually and legally
quite different than the above cases, in Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., a copyright infringement and breach of
contract action, the California District Court used a more
nuanced approach. 60 The court found certain aspects of
plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace accounts were
discoverable, while others were not. Messaging systems
were sufficiently private and exclusive in nature such that
under the Stored Communications Act, defendants could
not insist upon their disclosure. Instead, defendants could
discover only limited aspects of the plaintiff’s social
networking pages. 61 The court determined that the requests
for Facebook and MySpace data that sought private
messages should be quashed, but remanded to determine
the degree of privacy present in Facebook “wall posts” and

60
61

Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 991.
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MySpace “comments,” as the degree of privacy of these
functions were less apparent than the private messages. 62

62

Id.

